Dan Lavigne
February 25th, 2018
Global Politics of Terrorism
Political Science
Sunday, February 25, 2018
Motifs and Motives
Lauren Journet
Professor Shirk
Global Politics of Terrorism
25 February 2018
Motifs
and Motives
During
the early 1700s, the Golden Age of Piracy roared in popularity as pirates took
over ships and claimed fortune and followers. Towards the end of the 1700s, the
Reign of Terror took the lives of the noble and civilian alike. The early 1900s
and the Holocaust brought methods of eugenics and ethnic cleansing to an entire
country. Beginning with the Golden Age of Piracy and the Reign of Terror and
then shifting towards the Holocaust, there appears to be a theme with the
attacks that occurred across the globe. Not only are these three periods of
time examples of extraneous violence, but these incidents of terror also stem
from both political and economic motives.
The pirates came to power during the Golden Age of Piracy
from the years of 1716 to 1726. At this time, there was an expansion in trade
and commerce across the Atlantic Ocean, giving pirates access to valuable goods
on ships. At first glance, pirates seem like merely troubled criminals. But the
political effects of the time were paramount. The pirates were well acquainted
with their surrounding political circumstances. However, their knowledge of the
absolute monarchy did not mean that they respected its power. In fact, the
pirates directly rejected the monarchy. Being against trade meant being against
the empire. Even some of the more developed countries such as Britain, France,
Portugal, and Spain were not powerful enough to protect themselves from the
pirates (“Golden Age of Piracy”). They lacked the fleets and men necessary to
successfully regulate the pirates- another testament to the political
atmosphere of the Golden Age of Piracy. The more obvious motivations were still
present, and economics did play a large role in piracy. The pirates collected
immense riches while simultaneously wreaking havoc on the system of trade. The
pirates were stealing money and goods not only to make a statement but also out
of pure enjoyment. Most pirates associated their time on the ship with a
vacation from the normal life of poverty.
The Reign of Terror took place in France and lasted from
September of 1793 to July of 1794. During this time, there were about 16,594
death sentences in the country. While savage, these sentences were did not come
without warning. The political infrastructure in France was crumbling, with the
traditional absolute monarchy faltering. The leader at the time, King Louis
XVI, called the Etats-General into session for assistance and was shocked when
the assembly refused to disband until a new constitution was created. The
functions of the monarchy were then suspended, and the king and queen were held
prisoner before both being executed (“Marie Antoinette and the French
Revolution”). In The French Revolution and Early European Revolutionary
Terrorism, Mike Rapport explains, “Private citizens also had a part to
play, not least in offering denunciations and information on ‘suspects’”
(Rapport 68). Anyone who was suspected to support the nobility was executed
along with the king and the queen. This made up a great portion of the 16,594
death sentences. There were also outstanding economic difficulties in
France. The country was deep in their debts due to a series of wars fought and
financed alike, such as the Seven Years War. In addition, the noble paid little
to no taxes but spent excessive amounts of money living their lavish
lifestyles.
The Holocaust itself lasted from
roughly 1939 to 1941, but years of oppression and destruction preceded and
followed this timeline. Many people know this to be an era of time in which
mass genocides and killings were rampid, but there was much more that
contributed to the madness. The Treaty of Versailles, effective in 1920,
initiated the Guilt Clause, which labeled Germany as an aggressor of World War
One. This clause restricted the German army to 100,000 troops and resulted in
reparations for the country. The Nazi Party then ran on an anti-government
nationalist platform. After this, when Hitler came to power, he used politics
to spread the ideas of eugenics and the oppression of Jewish people. The Law
for the Prevention of Genetically Diseased Offspring (1933) constructed a mass
sterilization program. The Blood Protection Law (1935) criminalized marital and
sexual relations with Jewish persons (“The Holocaust and World War II:
Timeline”). Hitler implemented these laws and used his political power to
isolate the entire groups of people, the Jewish population included. But this
maltreatment also stemmed from a deficient economic system. Germany’s state of
depression worsened following the Treaty of Versailles. The country was
crippled by debt and high unemployment after World War One.
The Golden Age of Piracy, the Reign of Terror, and the
Holocaust all claimed countless lives. On the surface, these attacks appear as
isolated incidents of violence. Spanning across nearly two hundred years, each
of the incidents shares a common trait. A closer examination of the three
attacks brings a theme of political and economic motives to light. This
understanding of the three incidents serves as an explanation for the use of
violence amongst three very different dominating powers- the pirates, the French,
and Hitler.
Works Cited
“Golden Age of
Piracy.” Notorious Privateers,
Buccaneers, Pirates and
Their Exploits, www.goldenageofpiracy.org/.
“The Holocaust and
World War II: Timeline.” United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum,
United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum,
www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007653.
“Marie Antoinette
and the French Revolution.” PBS,
Public Broadcasting Service,
Rapport, Mike. “The
French Revolution and Early European Revolutionary Terrorism.” The
Routledge
History of Terrorism, Routledge Publishing, 2015.
The Ongoing Effects of Anarchist Terrorism
The Ongoing Effects of Anarchist Terrorism
In the late 1880s a new wave of terrorism began to emerge: anarchist assassinations and bombings known as propaganda of the deed. While this violence was revolutionary at the time, it continues to motivate modern terrorist actions. From the anarchist violence of the late 19th and early 20th century to the Weather Underground Organization and Conspiracy of the Fire Nuclei today, not much has changed between the motivations and actions of these terrorist groups.
As the Federal Bureau of Investigation states, “Anarchist extremism in the U.S. encompasses a variety of ideologies, including anti-capitalism, anti-globalism, and anti-urbanization” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010). This rang true throughout the late 1880s and continues to be the spark that drives some terrorist actors today. The Weather Underground movement was a far-left group explicitly created to protest issues within the United States government, such as Vietnam War policies, racial discrimination, and growing corporate greed. Similarly, the Conspiracy of the Fire Nuclei aims to spread their anti-authority ideology through series of bombing attacks across their home country of Greece, likely stemming from the economic collapse and subsequent European Union bailout. Clearly the principles the FBI puts forth are not only applicable to the United States, but describe most anarchist terror movements across the globe since the 1880s.
The FBI also correctly explains that “The extremists are loosely organized, with no central leadership—although they occasionally demonstrate limited ability to mobilize themselves” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010). Weather Underground was made up of young adults, most of whom were college students, and never had an organized base for the FBI to directly target. They were a relatively small organization only capable of limited bombing attacks until their numbers grew. If this were achieved, they would then organize and launch a full revolution against the United States government. However, this expansion never occurred and most radicals gave up their revolutionary ideas and went on to live ordinary lives within the mainstream population (Eckstein, 2016). The Conspiracy of the Fire Nuclei works similarly: they have never been able to significantly harm their targets and have only garnered major attention for their mail bombing campaign in 2010. Acts of solidarity have been made in the group’s honor, but the decentralized nature of the organization prevents them from undertaking large-scale attacks that actually harm citizens or government officials (Keating 2010). While the group is still in operation today, they have significantly decreased in influence and threat, meaning that they too could reach the same fate of the Weather Underground movement.
Overall these two groups, and modern anarchist terrorism as a whole, demonstrate the same characteristics as the wave that occurred between the 1880s and the 1920s. Revolutionist ideology has the power to destroy the familiar system by which the majority of society is content with, automatically making them a substantial threat. While this form of terrorism is generally thought to be an isolated wave of violence which no longer impacts modern society, it clearly has a broader and deeper effect than originally noted. The primary goals of these organizations is to be heard by their respective governments and for meaningful change to benefit the groups they advocate for. David Rapoport believes anarchist violence began because “A ‘new form of communication’ was needed, one that would be heard and command respect” (Rapoport, 2002, 4). As in the case with Weather Underground and the Conspiracy of the Fire Nuclei, the members of each organization felt their voices were underrepresented or purpose ignored, so they resorted to violent tactics in an effort to garner attention for their causes. Brendan Chrzanowski of The Strategy Bridge analyzes this trend well; “it is too easy for groups such as the Conspiracy to get lost in the background. Allowing this might prove to be a costly mistake” (Chrzanowski, 2017). While the traditional wave of anarchist terror has ended, following this linear way of thinking alienates groups whose main goal is often only to be heard and represented.
Works Cited
Chrzanowski, Brendan. “The Conspiracy of Cells of Fire Resurgent.” The Strategy Bridge, 15 Aug. 2017, thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/8/15/the-conspiracy-of-cells-of-fire-resurgent.
Eckstein, Arthur M. “Weather Underground Changed the World, Even As It Fell Apart.” Time, Time Magazine, 2 Nov. 2016, time.com/4549409/the-weather-underground-bad-moon-rising/.
Keating, Joshua. “What do we know about the Conspiracy of the Fire Nuclei?” Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 4 Nov. 2010, foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/04/what-do-we-know-about-the-conspiracy-of-the-fire-nuclei/.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Anarchist Extremism: A Primer. 16 Nov. 2010, archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2010/november/anarchist_111610/anarchist_111610.
Friday, February 23, 2018
Holocaust: How Hitler's Discretion Allowed People To Deny The Holocaust
When going through the public education system, it is inevitable for students to learn about the Holocaust. The Holocaust is a historical event that is ingrained into the memories of our young minds, showing the atrocities of a section of time in history. But even with all the facts and evidence, there are people in present time that deny the Holocaust ever happened. Holocaust denial was made possible by the tactic of Hitler keeping the persecution of Jews a secret and not well known. The strategic handling of information about the Holocaust during the time of the persecution of the Jews made it possible for people to deny the Holocaust today. The masking of the events of the Holocaust was made possible through Nazi policy, the destruction of evidence, the discretion of Hitler, and the psychological disbelief of the public.
Holocaust deniers ignore the overwhelming evidence of the event and insist that the Holocaust is a myth that was created by the Allies, the Soviet communists, and the Jews for their own agendas (Gottfried & Alcorn, 2001, pp. 745-6). The warped logic the deniers formulated was that the Allies needed the “Holocaust myth” to justify their occupation of Germany in 1945 and the persecution of Nazi defendants. Holocaust deniers also claim that Jews needed the “Holocaust myth” to extract huge payments in restitution from Germany and to justify the establishment of the State of Israel (Gottfried & Alcorn, 2001, pp. 745-6). The belief of the deniers asserts that if they can discredit one fact about the Holocaust, the whole history of the event can be discredited as well (Gottfried & Alcorn, 2001, pp. 745-6). But how can a whole history of events, with physical evidence and survivors to add credibility to the bit of history, be discredited at all?
Nazi policy went through a lot to facilitate denial of the Holocaust even as the killing operation unfolded across German-occupied Europe during World War II. The Holocaust was a state secret in Nazi Germany and the Germans wrote down as little as possible ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 1). Most of the killing orders of the Jews were verbal, particularly at the highest levels of command. Hitler's order to kill Jews was issued only on a need-to-know basis, and the Nazi leaders generally avoided detailed planning of killing operations, preferring to proceed in a systematic but often improvised manner ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 1).
The surviving records of Auschwitz transports and killings are considerable, despite the efforts by retreating Germans to destroy all incriminating evidence before the camp's liberation (Reich, 1993). The Germans destroyed most documentation that did exist before the end of the war. The documents that survived and related directly to the killing program were virtually all classified and stamped “Geheime Reichssache” (Top Secret), requiring special handling and destruction to prevent capture by the enemy ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 1).
In order to hide the killing operation as much as possible, Hitler ordered that the killings not be spoken of directly in German documentation or in public statements. Instead, the Germans used code names and neutral-sounding terms for the killing process ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 2). Both at the time and later, such euphemisms impeded a clear understanding of what the Nazis were doing. This was partly to facilitate the killing process by keeping the victims in the dark about their fate as long as possible("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 2). Widespread Jewish resistance was only possible once Jews understood that Nazi policy was to kill all of them. Euphemistic language aided secrecy since only those who knew the “real” meaning of the words would understand the deeper meaning of public statements or accurately interpret the written document regarding the matter ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 2).
Despite Nazi efforts to keep secret the unfolding Holocaust, information did leak out. The perpetrators themselves talked about what they were doing. Occasionally, survivors of mass killing operations bore witness to the killing program (Evans, 2001). Both Jewish and Polish underground organizations made great efforts to let the outside world know what the Germans were doing in eastern Europe (Evans, 2001). The information was sometimes incomplete, contradictory, and inaccurate in some of the specific details, but the general policy and pattern of events were clear by the second half of 1942 (Evans, 2001).
However, the psychological barriers to accepting the existence of the Nazi killing program were considerable. The Holocaust was unprecedented and irrational. It was inconceivable that an advanced industrial nation would mobilize its resources to kill millions of peaceful civilians, including women and children, the elderly, and the very young ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 2). In doing so, the Nazis often acted contrary to German economic and military interests. For example, they intensified the killing operation, killing skilled Jewish laborers even while labor shortages threatened to undermine the German war effort ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 2).
Holocaust deniers want to debate the very existence of the Holocaust as a historical event. While the Second World War was still underway, the Nazis has already formed a contingency plan that in case of defeat they would carry out the total destruction of German records. The contingency plan coupled with Hitler's ability to keep the Holocaust out of the public eye allowed the possibility for the Holocaust to be denied. The question that allows the slightest doubt about if the Holocaust happened sprouts from: "How could 11 million people be killed an the world was so blind to the matter?" It is shocking to try and comprehend the number of people that were killed and how little the matter was publicized. Hitler's ability to only convey death orders through word of mouth, the German's contingency plan, and the death of Jews who witnessed the atrocities, allow suspicion to take root about what events actually took place.
Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial. (n.d.). Retrieved February 22,
2018, from https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007273
Evans, Richard J. Lying About Hitler: History, Holocaust, and the David Irving Trial.
New York: Basic Books, 2001
Gottfried, Ted. Deniers of the Holocaust: Who They Are, What They Do, Why They Do It.
Brookfield, CT: Twenty-First Century Books, 2001. pp.745-746.
Holocaust Deniers and Public Misinformation. (n.d.). Retrieved February 22, 2018, from
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007272
Lipstadt, Deborah. Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. New
York: Free Press, 1993.
Reich, Walter. Erasing the Holocaust. (1993, July 10). Retrieved February 22, 2018, from
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/11/books/erasing-the-holocaust.html?pagewanted=all
Holocaust deniers ignore the overwhelming evidence of the event and insist that the Holocaust is a myth that was created by the Allies, the Soviet communists, and the Jews for their own agendas (Gottfried & Alcorn, 2001, pp. 745-6). The warped logic the deniers formulated was that the Allies needed the “Holocaust myth” to justify their occupation of Germany in 1945 and the persecution of Nazi defendants. Holocaust deniers also claim that Jews needed the “Holocaust myth” to extract huge payments in restitution from Germany and to justify the establishment of the State of Israel (Gottfried & Alcorn, 2001, pp. 745-6). The belief of the deniers asserts that if they can discredit one fact about the Holocaust, the whole history of the event can be discredited as well (Gottfried & Alcorn, 2001, pp. 745-6). But how can a whole history of events, with physical evidence and survivors to add credibility to the bit of history, be discredited at all?
Nazi policy went through a lot to facilitate denial of the Holocaust even as the killing operation unfolded across German-occupied Europe during World War II. The Holocaust was a state secret in Nazi Germany and the Germans wrote down as little as possible ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 1). Most of the killing orders of the Jews were verbal, particularly at the highest levels of command. Hitler's order to kill Jews was issued only on a need-to-know basis, and the Nazi leaders generally avoided detailed planning of killing operations, preferring to proceed in a systematic but often improvised manner ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 1).
The surviving records of Auschwitz transports and killings are considerable, despite the efforts by retreating Germans to destroy all incriminating evidence before the camp's liberation (Reich, 1993). The Germans destroyed most documentation that did exist before the end of the war. The documents that survived and related directly to the killing program were virtually all classified and stamped “Geheime Reichssache” (Top Secret), requiring special handling and destruction to prevent capture by the enemy ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 1).
In order to hide the killing operation as much as possible, Hitler ordered that the killings not be spoken of directly in German documentation or in public statements. Instead, the Germans used code names and neutral-sounding terms for the killing process ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 2). Both at the time and later, such euphemisms impeded a clear understanding of what the Nazis were doing. This was partly to facilitate the killing process by keeping the victims in the dark about their fate as long as possible("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 2). Widespread Jewish resistance was only possible once Jews understood that Nazi policy was to kill all of them. Euphemistic language aided secrecy since only those who knew the “real” meaning of the words would understand the deeper meaning of public statements or accurately interpret the written document regarding the matter ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 2).
Despite Nazi efforts to keep secret the unfolding Holocaust, information did leak out. The perpetrators themselves talked about what they were doing. Occasionally, survivors of mass killing operations bore witness to the killing program (Evans, 2001). Both Jewish and Polish underground organizations made great efforts to let the outside world know what the Germans were doing in eastern Europe (Evans, 2001). The information was sometimes incomplete, contradictory, and inaccurate in some of the specific details, but the general policy and pattern of events were clear by the second half of 1942 (Evans, 2001).
However, the psychological barriers to accepting the existence of the Nazi killing program were considerable. The Holocaust was unprecedented and irrational. It was inconceivable that an advanced industrial nation would mobilize its resources to kill millions of peaceful civilians, including women and children, the elderly, and the very young ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 2). In doing so, the Nazis often acted contrary to German economic and military interests. For example, they intensified the killing operation, killing skilled Jewish laborers even while labor shortages threatened to undermine the German war effort ("Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial", pp. 2).
Holocaust deniers want to debate the very existence of the Holocaust as a historical event. While the Second World War was still underway, the Nazis has already formed a contingency plan that in case of defeat they would carry out the total destruction of German records. The contingency plan coupled with Hitler's ability to keep the Holocaust out of the public eye allowed the possibility for the Holocaust to be denied. The question that allows the slightest doubt about if the Holocaust happened sprouts from: "How could 11 million people be killed an the world was so blind to the matter?" It is shocking to try and comprehend the number of people that were killed and how little the matter was publicized. Hitler's ability to only convey death orders through word of mouth, the German's contingency plan, and the death of Jews who witnessed the atrocities, allow suspicion to take root about what events actually took place.
Bibliography
Combating Holocaust Denial: Origins of Holocaust Denial. (n.d.). Retrieved February 22,
2018, from https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007273
Evans, Richard J. Lying About Hitler: History, Holocaust, and the David Irving Trial.
New York: Basic Books, 2001
Gottfried, Ted. Deniers of the Holocaust: Who They Are, What They Do, Why They Do It.
Brookfield, CT: Twenty-First Century Books, 2001. pp.745-746.
Holocaust Deniers and Public Misinformation. (n.d.). Retrieved February 22, 2018, from
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007272
Lipstadt, Deborah. Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. New
York: Free Press, 1993.
Reich, Walter. Erasing the Holocaust. (1993, July 10). Retrieved February 22, 2018, from
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/11/books/erasing-the-holocaust.html?pagewanted=all
Monday, February 5, 2018
Definition Terrorism
Daniel J. Lavigne
February 4th, 2018
Global Politics of Terrorism
Political Science
What is Terrorism?
If one were to open any web browser for the internet
and run a search for images for “terrorism” what will appear on the screen? The
first set of images people will see are of masked men holding rifles aims at
hostages. The second set of images depicts the aftermath of deadly explosions,
flames ripping through vehicles. These two images do not fully encapsulate the
term terrorism. This essay will examine the work of three leading scholars and
present their definitions of terrorism to compare it to my argued definition. I
argue that definition of terrorism is the use of illegitimate violence politically
motivated by a force to promote and impose its ideology upon others, operating
outside the standard definition of war.
In David C. Rapoport’s work, “The Four Waves of Rebel
Terror and September 11” he demonstrates that modern terrorism, at the time of
his writing, had 135 of history behind it. The first wave began in the 1880’s
and lasted until about the 1920’s. This era was defined by anarchist terrorism,
both in Europe and the United States. Two things brought this wave about,
doctrine and technology. According to Rapoport, Russian writers, “...created a
doctrine or strategy for terror, an inheritance for successors to use, improve,
and transmit...” ideas (Rapoport, 2002). This was an age when terrorism was
very much about trial and error, where terrorism acted as a laboratory. In
addition to the transmission of ideas, communication in the form of tit-for-tat
atrocities committed by Russian and Turkish officials allowed for anarchist to
play by such rules as well. “Terror was extra-normal violence or violence
beyond the moral conventions regulating violence. Most specifically, the
conventions violated were the rules of war designed to distinguish combatants
from non-combatants” (Rapoport, 2002). Anarchist felt they were able to use
indiscriminate violence as they saw fit. They viewed terrorism as a “...
strategy, not an end” (Rapoport, 2002). This allowed them to keep playing, as
they did not see the value in having government.
The second wave began in the 1920s’
and ended in the 1960’s. This was known as the “Anti-Colonial Wave”. This can
be best defined as terror used in the form of guerrilla warfare. These fights
would target members of domestic security forces. This would case the military
to step in to fill the void and would produce bloodshed due to their lack of
specific training for urban areas. Terrorist then gained support from the
people, making it harder for the government to maintain control (Rapoport,
2002).
The third wave lasted from about the 1960’s and lasted
until about the 1990’s. This wave was known as the “New Left Wave” and was
associated with radicalism closely tied with nationalism. Groups used terrorism
internationally to promote awareness of issues back at home. Two examples are
the IRA to bring awareness about Northern Ireland, as well as ASALA to bring about
the awareness about Armenia’s historical ties to eastern Turkey.
The fourth wave began in the late 1970’s and continues
to this day. This wave is associated mainly with Islam and focuses on creating,
“...massive attacks against military and government installations” (Rappaport,
2002). These attacks are designed to weaken the United States, so they may
leave the region. With the United States gone the idea is to supply “....
justifications and organizing principles for the New World to be established”
(Rappaport, 2002). For terrorism in the Middle East, this is designed to lay
the groundwork for a single Arab state under a ruling Sharia system of laws.
Rappaport has demonstrated that nature
of terrorism has changed over the century. His four waves demonstrate how the
rationale and the goals of terrorism has changed both across time and culture,
but one factor has remained constant. This constant is tactics. Terrorism is
asymmetrical and used to disrupt society, to demonstrate one’s grievances, not
just domestically, but to the wider global community as well.
Even though Rapport mentions waves of
terror in his work he fails to see that ideology matters in all these cases, an
is reflective of the changing political systems by sovereign states. Anarchist
were inspired by Russian writers’ frustration with the lack of progress made by
the state. In historical context Europe was advancing ahead of Russia, and
Czarist regimes failed to recognize the need to modernize their state. The
British and French were forced to decolonize in the wake of the Second World
War, due to finances back at home. The events in the second wave are viewed as
a way of maintaining control over these colonial possessions. The third wave
was associated with radical nationalism. This was where radical groups within
countries wished to break away. They were unsuccessful because their “parent”
states were able to put down this violence. The fourth wave is driven by
religious ideology, whether by Christianity, Judaism, or Islam. In the Middle
East this radical ideology has an anti-western sentiment. These grievances are
based on western overthrow of regimes going back to the 1950’s, just to name
one example.
In Philip Bobbitt's work “Terror and Consent: The Wars
for the Twenty-First Century” he came up with a similar timeline much like
Rapport to explain the evolutionary nature of terrorism over the past five
hundred years. He divides this period into several different eras, each with
its own set of characteristics to terrorism and the structure of society.
For Bobbitt, terrorism begins with the
princely states of the Renaissance. Here we had the first instance of “state
sponsored” terrorism in part to the consolidation of power away from the
oligarchs. This drove groups “... to attack civilians as a political reaction
to exclusion from power. The most important terrorists, however, were those
drawn from the very forces the new states were compelled to employ to protect themselves”
(Bobbitt, 2008, p.27). It was hired mercenaries that acted as the first group
of terrorists. It was these mercenaries that sacked large population centers
such as Rome and Antwerp by the middle of the 1500’s.
The next era for Bobbitt occurred
between the 1600-1800’s and became known as the kingly state. This occurred
when the “... constitutional order... [of]...1648 had superseded the princely
state-reunited these two elements, monarch and state, creating an absolute
sovereign and making of the king himself the State (Bobbitt, 2008, p.30). This
allowed the monarch to extend his reach beyond the borders of Europe using
privateering to attack other states at sea. Monarchies eventually lost control
and as “...terrorists, they [pirates] became legendary for their cruelty to
their defenseless civilian captives, and for their independent political
agenda. This marked them as terrorists of the kingly state not simply because
they served that constitutional order as mercenaries and preyed on civilians,
but because they, like the kingly states that employed them, relied upon a
nonsectarian ethos and claimed that the use of armed violence was lawful when
authorized by a "sovereign" (Bobbitt, 2008, p.31). They thought of
themselves as kings of the sea, which was a concern to the monarchs, as piracy was
a threat to undermine the sovereigns power.
Bobbitt continues his analysis to talk about what he
calls the territorial state. The “...territorial state was defined by its
geographical contiguity and therefore fretted constantly about its borders. For
the territorial state, its frontiers defined its legitimacy, its defense
perimeter, its tax base” (Bobbitt, 2008, p.34). He notes that colonial powers
often used Native Americans as proxies to do their bidding in New World
territory. This was seen in the Seven Years War, or the French and Indian War
in the Americas. During this was “…two great territorial states-Britain and
France-used local indigenous tribes, mainly the Iroquois and the Algonquin, to
terrorize the colonial population through a campaign of massacres, torture, and
kidnapping” (Bobbitt, 2008, p.35).
Bobbitt goes on to mention three more
periods in his work. He talks about the state-nation where “...governments came
to power that were based on the idea that legitimacy was a matter of fitness to
rule, and that this fitness was properly judged by the national people”
(Bobbitt, 2008, p.38). This was seen in the Revolutions of both the United
States and France, respectively. He also goes on to talk about the post First
World War environment of nation states where, for the first time we have a
heightened sense of nationalism seen under the creation of welfare states. It
was during this heightened sense of nationalism where groups called themselves
freedom fighters to create a state, forming a unified ethnic identity. The last
era which we are currently in is called the market state terrorism. This is
where funding for terrorism comes from several different sources from across
the world. It "...neither relies on the support of sovereign states nor is
constrained by the limits on violence that state sponsors have observed
themselves or placed on their proxies…” (Bobbitt, 2008, p.45). This makes
fighting the global war on terrorism difficult.
Bobbitt’s work takes the reader
through several different eras to understand terrorism, in a more nuanced
sense. Each era defines terrorism a little differently in how one era flows
into the next. Bobbitt believes that terrorism acts as an opposition to or acts
as a reflection to the current order. He states: “In each era, terrorism
derives its ideology in reaction to the raison d' etre of the dominant
constitutional order, at the same time negating and rejecting that form's
unique ideology but mimicking the form's structural characteristics” (Bobbitt,
2008, p.26). In this fashion terrorism is an idea that feeds itself to work
around the opposition’s goals. Sometimes it even borrows the strategy to be
used for its own purposes.
In Bobbitt’s work he notes that terrorism acts as an
opposition to or acts as a reflection to the current order. This means that the
definition of terrorism is fluid and will change over time. In terms of the eras
that account for the three centuries 1500-1800 actions by groups were state lead.
For any scenario during these three centuries, there is a greater story where
state actors are involved, no matter what form of government or the territorial
map in play. For example, princes, used mercenaries to fight other mercenaries
in rival princedoms. Kings, though powerful were able to use pirates to their
advantage-at least for a little while to attack rival vessels out at sea.
Lastly, even though empires in Europe carved up an administered territory, they
still were able to form alliances with Native American proxies due fighting
over in Europe. The common theme here, though not directly acknowledge is that
these conflicts are state lead and can be deemed as acts of war. Therefore,
this cannot be considered terrorism.
In Charles Tilly’s work “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorist”
he argues that these three terms mentioned in his title are more nuanced than
how most people think about these terms. He views terror is a tactic, terrorist
is one who is using that tactic, terrorism is the use of that tool. Tilly
believes that there are four steps needed to be taken into consideration: 1)
strategy of intimidation 2) individuals that employ that strategy 3) systematic
strategy in the same setting and population 4) deploying terror under certain
political circumstances, usually with far more devastating effects than the
terror operations of non-specialists (Tilly, 2004, p.9). Tilly believes that
there are motives behind the terrorist and their actions, and that these events
are planned out against a certain group in advance.
In addition to the four steps taken
about Tilly argues that terrorism needs to be organized in some sort of
typology. He believes that there is a spectrum of specialization and well as
major locus for attacks. Autonomist launch attacks on authorities with little
degree of specialization. Zealots often attack outside their home. Militias are
highly specialized and will launch attacks at home. Conspirators are highly
specialized and will launch attacks abroad. Due to a “...remarkable array of
actors sometimes adopt terror as a strategy, and therefore no coherent set of
cause effect propositions can explain terrorism as a whole” (Tilly, 2004, p.11).
In other words, Tilly believes that there is no one view of what a terrorist is
but feels like a workaround is required to categorize the group in the form of
how the tactics are employed instead.
Tilly frames this discussion noting
that terrorism must be thought of outside the terms of traditional warfare,
which is a “political struggle”. In doing so Tilly puts terrorism in a box that
can be studied and classified, like he does by asking what the common factors
are. Additionally, using that same type of careful study allows us to examine
terrorist actions on a spectrum. This allows one to see the political
motivation and the potential strength to impose an ideology through the
strength and location of their actions.
In conclusion I argue that definition
of terrorism is the use of illegitimate violence politically motivated by a
force to promote and impose its ideology upon others, operating outside the
standard definition of war. Tactics may be viewed as important by some by
ideology against the established powers must be taken into consideration as
they are the real driving force behind the use of violence. It is also worth
noting that state actions, despite the fact might be using proxies, still
constitutes war. Therefore, in this scenario such actions cannot be considered
terrorism. Lastly terrorism needs to be studied using standard criteria, but
also recognize that there are types of terrorism having varying strengths.
Works Cited
Bobbitt,
Philip. Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. Knopf. New
York. 2008. 27-63.
Rapoport,
David C. “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11”. Anthropoetics VIII, no. 1 Spring/ Summer
2002.
Tilly,
Charles. “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists”. Sociological
Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1, Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium. (Mar., 2004),
pp. 5-13.
Defining Terrorism
Lauren Journet
Professor Shirk
Global Politics of Terrorism
5 February 2018
Terrorism: a Matter of State and Non-State Actors
The year 2017 saw cases of vehicular attacks on protestors and gunmen holding up prayer services and killing those in worship. And these are only in America, not including the many Syrian air strikes and drone bombings chronicled each night on the news. This phenomena has gone from select and sporadic situations to a fact of life, with apps now programmed to give updates as soon as information comes out and Facebook creating the new check in feature for loved one to rely on. This word is often talked about, spilling from news reporter’s, politician’s, and civilian’s mouths as soon as rumors of an attack are released. While most people today can agree that terrorism is an act of violence, there is so much more to the definition that gets overlooked, sparking conversation amongst many political theorists. Terrorism is any act of violence made by either non-state or state groups that has political motivations and uses non-combatant and non-military personnel as potential targets.
Modern American society is plagued with stereotypes, especially those surrounding terrorism. Particularly on the topic of the terrorist, many Americans are taught to believe that those who do not have the same skin color or birth country are a suspect. This xenophobic tendency peaked following the attacks on September 11 and has not declined since, a fact that Lisa Stampnitzky familiarized herself with. Stampnitzky analysis in Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented Terrorism illustrates a contemporary perspective, arguing that the socially constructed definition of the word is ever-changing. Stampnitzky insists that there is no scientific definition of “terrorism” because it is a moral and political term. In opposition to the notion that terrorism is a natural occurrence, the modern (as of the years 1960 to 1970) definition was created by experts to help them study a certain phenomena. She asserts, “Since 9/11 Americans have been told that terrorists are pathological evildoers, beyond comprehension… Yet, before the 1970s, the acts we now understand as ‘terrorism’ were generally considered the work of rational, even sometimes honorable, actors” (Stampnitzky 3).
All insurgencies occuring before the 1970s were primarily viewed as rational. The change in social culture created an ideology that portrayed the insurgencies in an evil, villainous light. No longer were the days of trying to understand those who committed the actions. Now they are all automatically viewed as nefarious. This is, in part, because understanding terrorism could expose people to sympathy with terrorists, an idea that brings discomfort to many nationalist’s hearts. But terrorism does not always involve non-white people and it is certainly not always done by non-state actors.
The gruesome history of Nazi Germany is the most basic example to align with the fact that terrorism has been implemented by state actors. Adolf Hitler’s orders as dictator had political motives. It was widely known that he wanted to eliminate all Jewish persons in order to have a more pure society and his method of ethnic cleansing to the Jewish population is not latent. However, when listing examples of terrorist attacks, the Holocaust is not normally named. But the attacks on September 11th, the Boston Bombing, and the Las Vegas shooting are likely to make the list. This is not to say that the three previously mentioned attacks do not fall under the definition of terrorism, but rather to illustrate that these are not the only notable attacks. It is imperative to include state groups in the definition of terrorism, and the Holocaust is just one example. The attacks against the Jewish people were violent, political, and against non-combatant personnel. These three components are the main focus of the definition of terrorism, as most people imagine this trifecta while searching for a denotation.
This definition draws primarily from David Rapoport’s description, as chronicled in his work Four Waves of Terror and September 11. The piece emphasizes Rapoport’s view that terrorism is a form of political violence against non-military targets by non-state actors (Rapoport). In this instance, there is no connection to specific ideologies such as religion, nationalism, or race. To provide further evidence for his perspective, Rapoport separates this into four separate sections, or “waves” as he calls them. The first is the Anarchist Wave, which included various assassinations, usually against the government. The second wave was the Anti-Colonial Wave, which included guerilla warfare tactics. The third was the New Left Wave, including acts of radicalism and nationalism. The fourth and final stage was the Religious Wave, with suicide bombings on the rise. The reason Rapoport goes into so much detail with each wave, giving dates and trends for each of the four, is to prove cohesion between the four eras. Each wave, though set in different decades with different tactics, all presented political and violent acts committed by non-state actors.
While Rapoport inserts politics and violence in his definition of terrorism, the definition is lacking the involvement of both state and non-state actors. One terrorism theorist that does include both state and non-state actors is Charles Tilly. According to this theorist and his work in “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists,” it is more about the concept of tactics, strategies, and groups having unified goals, and less about the group committing it (Tilly 5). This more inclusive definition means that “A great variety of individuals and groups engage in terror… most often alternating terror with other political strategies or with political inaction” (Tilly 6). Based on this definition of terrorism, Hitler would be considered a terrorist. Though it allows state actors to be deemed as terrorist, Charles Tilly’s definition places “terrorism” in the confines of tactic and strategy. While that is true in some cases, David Rapoport was right to include political violence in his definition.
The merging of these two definitions creates a pristine denotation of the word terrorism: any act of violence by non-state or state groups with a political motivation and non-combatant targets. To this, Philip Bobbitt takes issue. Bobbitt counters Rapoport’s four waves with six states in his piece Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. The Princely States was formed out of mercenaries. The Kingley States involved buccaneers and privateers. Territorial States included barbary corsairs. The State-Nation was made up of anarchists, not to be confused with the Nation States and its nationalists. Bobbitt’s list ends with the Market States and al Qaeda. He summarizes that the states “carried out such attacks in violation of the orders of the states with which they were allied, often using their assaults to gain leverage against the state that employed them” (Bobbit 30). The pattern in all six states is that in each century there is an opposition to the current order. Therefore according to Bobbitt, terrorism is any violence in opposition to a current constitutional or international global order.
But terrorism is so much more than this. Revisiting the example of the Holocaust, Adolf Hitler was solely in opposition to the Jewish inhabitants of Germany. There was no constitutional order or international global order to defy. His actions were based exclusively on achieving his goal, violence, and hate. While Bobbitt’s definition is fitting for the time periods it describes, it leaves out important pieces to the word’s meaning, an action so much more than the opposition. Terrorism is merciless, terrorism is goal-oriented, and terrorism is political. While it can also be an opposition to a current order, if the definition stops there it may leave out cases such as the Holocaust, cases that deserve to be acknowledged as terrorism. For someone that admits, “There is some disagreement, to is in fact to say that the number of attacks is declining; there is no dispute that the number of casualties and deaths is increasing” (Bobbitt 49), it is unclear why his definition is so narrow that it does not consider cases that do not defy constitutional orders.
Terrorism happens everywhere. Overseas there are stories about bombings, taking out entire villages. On American soil there are stories of gunmen targeting crowds of harmless bystanders. These violent approaches are all intentionally done, instilling fear and wreaking havoc on whole communities. In defining this word, some components should not be ignored. Terrorism is an act of violence with political motivations against non-combatant personnel. These acts are committed by both state and non-state actors, the difference between the two trivial. Terrorism is here, it is there, and it is happening now. A word like this cannot be left undefined.
Works Cited
Bobbitt, Philip. Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. New York, Random
House Incorporated, 2008.
Rapoport, David C. "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11." Anthropoetics: the
Journal of Generative Anthropology, vol. VIII, no. 1, 2002,
anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror/. Accessed 30 Jan. 2018.
Stampnitzky, Lisa. Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented Terrorism. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2014.
Tilly, Charles. “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists.” Sociological Theory, vol. 22, no. 1, 2004, pp.
5–13.
Defining Terrorism
Brenna Kueter
Professor Shirk
POL 357: Global Politics of Terrorism
February 5, 2018
Defining Terrorism
Terrorism is a constant reality that has permeated politics since the rise of organized states in the 1500s. However, because of the continuous nature of terror, it is much too complicated to contain in a single scientific definition. The best working definition of the term is provided by United States Department of State, which concludes that terrorism is a “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (United States Department of State). However, this definition fails to realize that ultimately terrorism is defined by the people experiencing it at any given point; it is socially constructed. Each generation faces a new and different threat to their established order and ways of life, thus requiring a reevaluation of how terrorism will be perceived, defined, and counteracted. So while this objective term is a useful starting point for studying current forms of terrorism, it is incomplete and does not accurately describe terrorism over time.
The State Department’s definition includes the following core aspects: political motivations, violent actions, non-combatant targets, and subnational or clandestine perpetrators. However, there is extensive controversy surrounding these aspects of the definition, so there must be modifications if it is to accurately describe terrorism as a whole. Political motivations are defended by Charles Tilly, who writes that “the strategy of terror appears across a wide variety of political circumstances, in the company of very different sorts of political struggle” (Tilly 10). Philip Bobbitt, on the other hand, maintains that “terrorism derives its ideology in reaction to the raison d’être of the dominant constitutional order” (Bobbitt 26). Therefore, political reasoning cannot be a required aspect of a terrorist event, as incidents with different motivations are also labeled under the umbrella of terrorism. The condition that civilians are the sole targeted group of terrorist activities is another controversial component of the definition of terrorism. David Rapoport explains that "Fourth wave groups, much more than their counterparts in the third wave, have made massive attacks against military and government installations” (Rapoport 9). These attacks theoretically fit within the other elements of the definition, so the idea that terrorist attacks are carried out exclusively on noncombatants is not accurate. Subnational actors are also a disputed element of the definition: Tilly states that “weak, beleaguered governments often adopt the strategy” while Bobbitt maintains “Market state terrorist operations are often outsourced to local groups, which are paid for their work and provided with infrastructure and some planning” (Tilly 10, Bobbitt 50). Both non-state and official actors can initiate terrorist attacks, so this too cannot be a required element. The one aspect of the State Department’s definition that is indisputable is the fact that terrorism involves a violent course of action. Charles Tilly writes that terror includes an “asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies” and often “a recurrent strategy of intimidation occurs” (Tilly 5, 9). Rappoport agrees, stating, “Terror was extra-normal violence or violence beyond the moral conventions of regulating violence (Rapoport 4). If violence is the only nom-refuted component of the State Department’s definition, clearly this term is misrepresenting what terrorism truly is.
The State Department’s definition of terrorism is not a complete explanation because it is attempting to contain a tactic and methodology into a single rational definition as if it were an analytical incident. While theorists such as Rapoport and Bobbitt employ this technique of analyzing terrorist activity, Tilly rightly concludes that terrorism is a strategy that can be used to achieve the goal of the terrorist, or person using this tactic. The analytical approach fails to address the fact that terrorism has substantially changed over time, meaning that many actions deemed terrorism at the time of the act are not included in these authors’ examinations. Evaluating historical instances of terror while using a modern definition of term adds useless complications and prevents a comprehensive study of the term. However, working from the premise that terrorism is a tactic defined explicitly by the society of the era allows for all cases of terrorism to be included in studies. Many terrorists, or those who adopt the mechanism of terrorism, do not meet the criteria the State Department puts forth, yet they are included within the realm of terrorism by society. There is obviously a disconnect between defining terrorism in academia and examining real-world situations, and it is clear that the general public sees terrorism as a violent tactic employed to instill fear rather than a list of specific criteria that must be met.
Philip Bobbitt and David Rapoport specifically mention “waves” of terror, each covering a time period where distinct actions and goals were articulated by terrorist groups (Bobbit 27, Rapoport 1). Some waves had extreme terror campaigns that would not be considered a radical act by today’s standards, but at the time it was an eye-opening and fear-instilling response. These instances do not all fit within the benchmarks of the State Department definition of terrorism, however, at the time of each attack the event was a clear act of terror. For example, the Anarchist Wave of the 1880s utilized assassinations and bombings of leaders, a recognizable politically motivated violent event, but it is arguable whether leaders are civilians or combatants in this situation. The subsequent Anti-Colonial Wave of the 1920s through the 1960s saw a rise in guerrilla warfare, again a violent action taken by a non-state actor, but they primarily targeted military and combatant targets. The New Left Wave of the late 1960s through 1990s combined radical and nationalistic feelings with violent attacks stemming from political strife, but the targets were generally not ordinary civilians. Lastly, the Religious Wave beginning in 1979 has shown a rise in suicide bombs, a violent action by subnational groups with the intent to create a new world order, but these attacks have most often been against combatant targets (Rapoport 2-10).
The State Department’s definition of terrorism is not a complete explanation because it is attempting to contain a tactic and methodology into a single rational definition as if it were an analytical incident. While theorists such as Rapoport and Bobbitt employ this technique of analyzing terrorist activity, Tilly rightly concludes that terrorism is a strategy that can be used to achieve the goal of the terrorist, or person using this tactic. The analytical approach fails to address the fact that terrorism has substantially changed over time, meaning that many actions deemed terrorism at the time of the act are not included in these authors’ examinations. Evaluating historical instances of terror while using a modern definition of term adds useless complications and prevents a comprehensive study of the term. However, working from the premise that terrorism is a tactic defined explicitly by the society of the era allows for all cases of terrorism to be included in studies. Many terrorists, or those who adopt the mechanism of terrorism, do not meet the criteria the State Department puts forth, yet they are included within the realm of terrorism by society. There is obviously a disconnect between defining terrorism in academia and examining real-world situations, and it is clear that the general public sees terrorism as a violent tactic employed to instill fear rather than a list of specific criteria that must be met.
Philip Bobbitt and David Rapoport specifically mention “waves” of terror, each covering a time period where distinct actions and goals were articulated by terrorist groups (Bobbit 27, Rapoport 1). Some waves had extreme terror campaigns that would not be considered a radical act by today’s standards, but at the time it was an eye-opening and fear-instilling response. These instances do not all fit within the benchmarks of the State Department definition of terrorism, however, at the time of each attack the event was a clear act of terror. For example, the Anarchist Wave of the 1880s utilized assassinations and bombings of leaders, a recognizable politically motivated violent event, but it is arguable whether leaders are civilians or combatants in this situation. The subsequent Anti-Colonial Wave of the 1920s through the 1960s saw a rise in guerrilla warfare, again a violent action taken by a non-state actor, but they primarily targeted military and combatant targets. The New Left Wave of the late 1960s through 1990s combined radical and nationalistic feelings with violent attacks stemming from political strife, but the targets were generally not ordinary civilians. Lastly, the Religious Wave beginning in 1979 has shown a rise in suicide bombs, a violent action by subnational groups with the intent to create a new world order, but these attacks have most often been against combatant targets (Rapoport 2-10).
The analytical definition the State Department provides is clearly not broad enough to cover all of these terrorist instances, but every violent case has the same tactic of terrorism behind it. Each of these incidents would be discredited in some way when using the analytical definition, but by studying terrorism as a methodology these events can be considered terrorism at the time of attack, even if the current era’s approach and definition of terror differ. While a hard definition of the term would be socially constructed by those experiencing the terror of the era, treating terrorism as a tactic can remove the biases of those experiencing violence and fearing a particular group. An analytical definition of terrorism thus can never be created as terror is not rational or scientific, but rather an illogical phenomena occurring over centuries of history.
Overall it is clear that while the definition of terrorism released by the United States Department of State is a useful starting point to study modern terrorist events, it does not accurately reflect terrorism over time. In order to examine these instances terrorism must be acknowledged as a tactic employed over multiple generations, not a specific list of criteria that fit only the modern forms terrorism takes on. If this list of modern benchmarks continues to be used in studying terrorism over time, all studies will be skewed and tainted by this narrow and incorrect mindset.
Works Cited
Bobbitt, Philip. Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. Alfred A. Knopf, 2008.
Rapoport, David C. The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11. Anthropoetics: the Journal of Generative Anthropology, 2002.
Tilly, Charles. “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists.” Sociological Theory, vol. 22, no. 1, Mar. 2004.
United States Department of State. “Legislative Requirements and Key Terms.” https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65464.pdf.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)