Effectiveness of Anti-Pirate Policies

Dan Lavigne

February 25th, 2018

Global Politics of Terrorism

Political Science

Effectiveness of Anti-Pirate Policies

The Golden Age of Piracy lasted for a decade between 1716 and 1726. This was a period of proliferation in the number pirate activities and a time when government resources of the British crown were strapped. Due to smart policy decisions from London, this period of naval history drew to a close with the capture and hanging of William Fly in Boston in 1726. I argue that coordinated anti-pirate policy was the most effective means of eliminating piracy and that expanded agency allowed authorities prosecute acts of piracy leading to their overall elimination.

The end of the Golden Age of Piracy starts with the establishment of international naval norms of the 15th century during the Age of Exploration. Monarchs in Europe sought to expand their power by amassing wealth in the New World. The great powers of the day, Portugal and Spain needed a way to settle land disputes before it would erupt in a war, which had the potential of tearing Europe apart. The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) brokered by the Pope Alexander VI did just this, by giving the two countries land in the New World, it allowed each country to have their own economic space. The potential for conflict was reduced and what emerged was the idea that affairs in the New World should not bleed into the politics of Europe. This marks the creation of the line, dividing the affairs of Europe with the affairs of the New World, and would play a larger role when addressing the issue of piracy. Further treaties such as the 1559 Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis between France and Spain helped solidify this idea of the line as well, as it became an accepted idea among the powers of Europe (Shirk, 2016).

The Atlantic Ocean beyond the line can be viewed as the first “wild west” where there there was very little centralized rule, especially during the beginning of the colonial period. Governments, respected the line, while simultaneously needing resources such as gold and silver brought from the new world, would often hire “...privateers—state-commissioned sea raiders—carried out warfare over trading lanes…” (Shirk, 2016, 8). In other words, England, who was a budding naval power,  would issue letters of marque to her citizens to raid Spanish ships and bring a portion of the goods back home, while allowing them to keep the rest.

Piracy eventually shifted away from being  a state sponsored  activity to one that was more individualistic, as it became less fashionable in global affairs. The changing economic system played a large part due to the advent of new trade patterns, and larger revenue streams from taxation. This was never more evident in the case of triangular trade, which brought English-made manufactured goods to Africa, slaves to the Americas, and raw materials back to England. “Trade functioned best in peace, and it became harder to justify continued warfare beyond the line” (Shirk, 2016,8-9). Privateering needed to end as trade was too valuable for every nation in Europe to be the cause for war. In addition this practice also threaten political peace back home. If “...England could not protect property rights, its utility to those it claimed to rule would dwindle significantly. The disruption to trade took money directly out of state coffers in the form of stolen treasure. Pirates took an estimated 2,400 English ships between the years 1716–1726, more than the privateering ventures of any state during the recent war” (Shirk, 2016, 9). These acts at sea damaged the state revenues and people felt that Britain could no longer protect their interest. Action needed to be taken.

Britain came up with a number of strategies in the decade leading up to conclusion of the Golden Age of Piracy. The state issued pardons, effectively forgiving the pirates for their past deeds, in exchange for this discontinuation of those acts. The second strategy was to use the navy to force pirates to give up their ways. Both of these were ineffective, as I will explain later on. The last, and most effective strategy, was a coordination of colonial policies as well as extended  jurisdiction to colonies in the New World thus having them take responsibility for prosecuting pirates.

Starting under King George in 1717, the first strategy British employed was the use of pardons. As previously mentioned in order to have permission to be a privateer, one needed to get permission from the Crown in the form of a letter of marque. Pardons were like letters but were applied retroactively. In others words, letters of marque gave permission for future actions on the high seas, while pardons acted as a form of forgivenss for past actions, which the condition of hanging up their hat never to sail again. This strategy ended up being relatively ineffective. In Arne Bialuschewski’s work Pirates, markets and imperial authority: economic aspects of maritime depredations in the Atlantic World, 1716 – 1726 he notes that “...the men facing the forces of law and order in New Providence, only a few marauders gave up their plunder in exchange for an ordinary life under dismal and impoverished conditions in the colonies. Furthermore, some accepted the amnesty and then simply resumed their criminal activity...”(Bialuschewski, 2008, 58). In other words, pirates ignored authority and continued to plunder the seas. One notable example includes Blackbeard who  “...accepted a pardon that came with land in North Carolina, a title, and the hand of a local aristocrat’s daughter, only to go back “‘upon the account”’ within months (Shirk, 2016, 12). Not even land could make him stay, from the life he loved out at sea.  

The second strategy was to use the British Navy to rid the sea of pirates. This strategy was not affected due to tactics and technology. In terms of tactics naval “... power in the earlier parts of the golden age tended to be used to guard ships directly” (Shirk, 2016, 12). In other words, the job of the navy was to protect the sea lanes, and guide other ships to their needed destination. Technology, played a role as well. The British Navy consisted of large slow moving  ships making it “...quite cumbersome and unable [for them] to chase pirates into shallower waters” (Shirk, 2016, 12). This made eliminating pirates nearly impossible.  

The last strategy the British employed was the use of legislation to reduce the number of pirates in the Atlantic. The first step  was to centralize military authority of the seas.To regulate such acts England, “...began to tell colonial governors that they could not undertake measures of war without London’s blessing and until 1689 for all West Indian governors to be barred from issuing letters of marque...” (Shirk, 2016,9). This was the first attempt to reduce the amount of would-be pirates in the Caribbean. Essentially, it made it hard to gain letters of marque, because one had to go to London in order acquire one, and going beyond one’s marque would brand them as a pirate.

When the Government realized that more privateers were gaining the status of pirate a number of laws were enacted such as the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy 1699. This was an attempted to reduce pirate activities on the high seas. This act was renewed in  1701, 1715, and 1719 respectfully and became legitimate over time. “The law became much more effective when England allowed Vice-Admiralty courts to be established in its Caribbean, Western African, and North American colonies to try pirates. Previously, all pirates were tried either in London or in local colonial courts” (Shirk, 2016, 13). In essence this allowed colonies to try pirates for their crimes in their home waters creating a sense of agency and responsibility for one’s jurisdiction. In addition of increasing agency within the colonies. The Crown needed to cut of economic relations between pirates and traders. “In March 1722 it was enacted that anyone who ‘’trade[d] with any Pirate, by Truck, Barter, Exchange, or in any other Manner, or furnish[ed] any Pirate, Felon or Robber upon the Seas, with any Ammunition, Provision or Stores of any Kind’ might be punished with death” (Shirk, 2016,61). This policy of effectively shutting down the ports, left pirates with no place to go. People could not longer associate themselves with pirates, leaving pirates the inability to participate in both society as well as economic affairs.

Works Cited 

Bialuschewski, Arne. "Pirates, markets and imperial authority: economic aspects of maritime depredations in the Atlantic World, 1716 – 1726. Global Crime. Vol. 9, Nos. 1–2, February–May 2008, 52–65.

Shirk Mark. “Bringing the State Back In” to the Empire Turn: Piracy and the Layered Sovereignty of the Eighteenth Century Atlantic. International Studies Review. August 21, 2016. 1–23