Definition Terrorism

Daniel J. Lavigne

February 4th, 2018

Global Politics of Terrorism

Political Science

What is Terrorism?

If one were to open any web browser for the internet and run a search for images for “terrorism” what will appear on the screen? The first set of images people will see are of masked men holding rifles aims at hostages. The second set of images depicts the aftermath of deadly explosions, flames ripping through vehicles. These two images do not fully encapsulate the term terrorism. This essay will examine the work of three leading scholars and present their definitions of terrorism to compare it to my argued definition. I argue that definition of terrorism is the use of illegitimate violence politically motivated by a force to promote and impose its ideology upon others, operating outside the standard definition of war.

In David C. Rapoport’s work, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11” he demonstrates that modern terrorism, at the time of his writing, had 135 of history behind it. The first wave began in the 1880’s and lasted until about the 1920’s. This era was defined by anarchist terrorism, both in Europe and the United States. Two things brought this wave about, doctrine and technology. According to Rapoport, Russian writers, “...created a doctrine or strategy for terror, an inheritance for successors to use, improve, and transmit...” ideas (Rapoport, 2002). This was an age when terrorism was very much about trial and error, where terrorism acted as a laboratory. In addition to the transmission of ideas, communication in the form of tit-for-tat atrocities committed by Russian and Turkish officials allowed for anarchist to play by such rules as well. “Terror was extra-normal violence or violence beyond the moral conventions regulating violence. Most specifically, the conventions violated were the rules of war designed to distinguish combatants from non-combatants” (Rapoport, 2002). Anarchist felt they were able to use indiscriminate violence as they saw fit. They viewed terrorism as a “... strategy, not an end” (Rapoport, 2002). This allowed them to keep playing, as they did not see the value in having government.

          The second wave began in the 1920s’ and ended in the 1960’s. This was known as the “Anti-Colonial Wave”. This can be best defined as terror used in the form of guerrilla warfare. These fights would target members of domestic security forces. This would case the military to step in to fill the void and would produce bloodshed due to their lack of specific training for urban areas. Terrorist then gained support from the people, making it harder for the government to maintain control (Rapoport, 2002).

The third wave lasted from about the 1960’s and lasted until about the 1990’s. This wave was known as the “New Left Wave” and was associated with radicalism closely tied with nationalism. Groups used terrorism internationally to promote awareness of issues back at home. Two examples are the IRA to bring awareness about Northern Ireland, as well as ASALA to bring about the awareness about Armenia’s historical ties to eastern Turkey.

The fourth wave began in the late 1970’s and continues to this day. This wave is associated mainly with Islam and focuses on creating, “...massive attacks against military and government installations” (Rappaport, 2002). These attacks are designed to weaken the United States, so they may leave the region. With the United States gone the idea is to supply “.... justifications and organizing principles for the New World to be established” (Rappaport, 2002). For terrorism in the Middle East, this is designed to lay the groundwork for a single Arab state under a ruling Sharia system of laws.

          Rappaport has demonstrated that nature of terrorism has changed over the century. His four waves demonstrate how the rationale and the goals of terrorism has changed both across time and culture, but one factor has remained constant. This constant is tactics. Terrorism is asymmetrical and used to disrupt society, to demonstrate one’s grievances, not just domestically, but to the wider global community as well.

          Even though Rapport mentions waves of terror in his work he fails to see that ideology matters in all these cases, an is reflective of the changing political systems by sovereign states. Anarchist were inspired by Russian writers’ frustration with the lack of progress made by the state. In historical context Europe was advancing ahead of Russia, and Czarist regimes failed to recognize the need to modernize their state. The British and French were forced to decolonize in the wake of the Second World War, due to finances back at home. The events in the second wave are viewed as a way of maintaining control over these colonial possessions. The third wave was associated with radical nationalism. This was where radical groups within countries wished to break away. They were unsuccessful because their “parent” states were able to put down this violence. The fourth wave is driven by religious ideology, whether by Christianity, Judaism, or Islam. In the Middle East this radical ideology has an anti-western sentiment. These grievances are based on western overthrow of regimes going back to the 1950’s, just to name one example.

In Philip Bobbitt's work “Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century” he came up with a similar timeline much like Rapport to explain the evolutionary nature of terrorism over the past five hundred years. He divides this period into several different eras, each with its own set of characteristics to terrorism and the structure of society.

          For Bobbitt, terrorism begins with the princely states of the Renaissance. Here we had the first instance of “state sponsored” terrorism in part to the consolidation of power away from the oligarchs. This drove groups “... to attack civilians as a political reaction to exclusion from power. The most important terrorists, however, were those drawn from the very forces the new states were compelled to employ to protect themselves” (Bobbitt, 2008, p.27). It was hired mercenaries that acted as the first group of terrorists. It was these mercenaries that sacked large population centers such as Rome and Antwerp by the middle of the 1500’s.

          The next era for Bobbitt occurred between the 1600-1800’s and became known as the kingly state. This occurred when the “... constitutional order... [of]...1648 had superseded the princely state-reunited these two elements, monarch and state, creating an absolute sovereign and making of the king himself the State (Bobbitt, 2008, p.30). This allowed the monarch to extend his reach beyond the borders of Europe using privateering to attack other states at sea. Monarchies eventually lost control and as “...terrorists, they [pirates] became legendary for their cruelty to their defenseless civilian captives, and for their independent political agenda. This marked them as terrorists of the kingly state not simply because they served that constitutional order as mercenaries and preyed on civilians, but because they, like the kingly states that employed them, relied upon a nonsectarian ethos and claimed that the use of armed violence was lawful when authorized by a "sovereign" (Bobbitt, 2008, p.31). They thought of themselves as kings of the sea, which was a concern to the monarchs, as piracy was a threat to undermine the sovereigns power.

Bobbitt continues his analysis to talk about what he calls the territorial state. The “...territorial state was defined by its geographical contiguity and therefore fretted constantly about its borders. For the territorial state, its frontiers defined its legitimacy, its defense perimeter, its tax base” (Bobbitt, 2008, p.34). He notes that colonial powers often used Native Americans as proxies to do their bidding in New World territory. This was seen in the Seven Years War, or the French and Indian War in the Americas. During this was “…two great territorial states-Britain and France-used local indigenous tribes, mainly the Iroquois and the Algonquin, to terrorize the colonial population through a campaign of massacres, torture, and kidnapping” (Bobbitt, 2008, p.35).

          Bobbitt goes on to mention three more periods in his work. He talks about the state-nation where “...governments came to power that were based on the idea that legitimacy was a matter of fitness to rule, and that this fitness was properly judged by the national people” (Bobbitt, 2008, p.38). This was seen in the Revolutions of both the United States and France, respectively. He also goes on to talk about the post First World War environment of nation states where, for the first time we have a heightened sense of nationalism seen under the creation of welfare states. It was during this heightened sense of nationalism where groups called themselves freedom fighters to create a state, forming a unified ethnic identity. The last era which we are currently in is called the market state terrorism. This is where funding for terrorism comes from several different sources from across the world. It "...neither relies on the support of sovereign states nor is constrained by the limits on violence that state sponsors have observed themselves or placed on their proxies…” (Bobbitt, 2008, p.45). This makes fighting the global war on terrorism difficult.

          Bobbitt’s work takes the reader through several different eras to understand terrorism, in a more nuanced sense. Each era defines terrorism a little differently in how one era flows into the next. Bobbitt believes that terrorism acts as an opposition to or acts as a reflection to the current order. He states: “In each era, terrorism derives its ideology in reaction to the raison d' etre of the dominant constitutional order, at the same time negating and rejecting that form's unique ideology but mimicking the form's structural characteristics” (Bobbitt, 2008, p.26). In this fashion terrorism is an idea that feeds itself to work around the opposition’s goals. Sometimes it even borrows the strategy to be used for its own purposes.

In Bobbitt’s work he notes that terrorism acts as an opposition to or acts as a reflection to the current order. This means that the definition of terrorism is fluid and will change over time. In terms of the eras that account for the three centuries 1500-1800 actions by groups were state lead. For any scenario during these three centuries, there is a greater story where state actors are involved, no matter what form of government or the territorial map in play. For example, princes, used mercenaries to fight other mercenaries in rival princedoms. Kings, though powerful were able to use pirates to their advantage-at least for a little while to attack rival vessels out at sea. Lastly, even though empires in Europe carved up an administered territory, they still were able to form alliances with Native American proxies due fighting over in Europe. The common theme here, though not directly acknowledge is that these conflicts are state lead and can be deemed as acts of war. Therefore, this cannot be considered terrorism.

In Charles Tilly’s work “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorist” he argues that these three terms mentioned in his title are more nuanced than how most people think about these terms. He views terror is a tactic, terrorist is one who is using that tactic, terrorism is the use of that tool. Tilly believes that there are four steps needed to be taken into consideration: 1) strategy of intimidation 2) individuals that employ that strategy 3) systematic strategy in the same setting and population 4) deploying terror under certain political circumstances, usually with far more devastating effects than the terror operations of non-specialists (Tilly, 2004, p.9). Tilly believes that there are motives behind the terrorist and their actions, and that these events are planned out against a certain group in advance.

          In addition to the four steps taken about Tilly argues that terrorism needs to be organized in some sort of typology. He believes that there is a spectrum of specialization and well as major locus for attacks. Autonomist launch attacks on authorities with little degree of specialization. Zealots often attack outside their home. Militias are highly specialized and will launch attacks at home. Conspirators are highly specialized and will launch attacks abroad. Due to a “...remarkable array of actors sometimes adopt terror as a strategy, and therefore no coherent set of cause effect propositions can explain terrorism as a whole” (Tilly, 2004, p.11). In other words, Tilly believes that there is no one view of what a terrorist is but feels like a workaround is required to categorize the group in the form of how the tactics are employed instead. 

          Tilly frames this discussion noting that terrorism must be thought of outside the terms of traditional warfare, which is a “political struggle”. In doing so Tilly puts terrorism in a box that can be studied and classified, like he does by asking what the common factors are. Additionally, using that same type of careful study allows us to examine terrorist actions on a spectrum. This allows one to see the political motivation and the potential strength to impose an ideology through the strength and location of their actions.

          In conclusion I argue that definition of terrorism is the use of illegitimate violence politically motivated by a force to promote and impose its ideology upon others, operating outside the standard definition of war. Tactics may be viewed as important by some by ideology against the established powers must be taken into consideration as they are the real driving force behind the use of violence. It is also worth noting that state actions, despite the fact might be using proxies, still constitutes war. Therefore, in this scenario such actions cannot be considered terrorism. Lastly terrorism needs to be studied using standard criteria, but also recognize that there are types of terrorism having varying strengths.

Works Cited

Bobbitt, Philip. Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. Knopf. New York. 2008. 27-63.

Rapoport, David C. “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11”. Anthropoetics VIII, no. 1 Spring/ Summer 2002.

Tilly, Charles. “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists”. Sociological Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1, Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium. (Mar., 2004), pp. 5-13.